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The contrasts between South Africa and the pre-
ceding study of Bangladesh offer a first taste of
important variations in elite perceptions from
country to country, which our research team will
develop more fully in longer studies of these two
and several other cases. Alongside the homoge-
neous Bangladeshi elite (singular) concentrated
mainly in one city, stand South Africa diverse
elites (plural) dispersed among numerous urban
centres which are separated by great distances and
much else besides.
Both of these societies (and most of the others that
are being studied in our larger project) are, unlike
most in the West, segmented. But the character of
segmentation in South Africa and Bangladesh dif-
fers in several important respects. This affects per-
ceptions both of the obligations of elites to the poor
within their social segments, and of the responsi-
bility of the whole society and of the government to
the poor in general.
While the Bangladeshi elite is undivided by any
great political or social cleavage and has a roughly
unified view of poverty, an important fault line runs
right through South Afriça's elites. It separates the
ruling ANC elite, which (despite some internal
variations) tends to perceive poverty in ways akin
to European social democrats, from most other
South African elites who stop well short of that out-
look. The ANC elite tends to regard poverty as an
urgent problem that can and must be tackled by
direct, targeted efforts by government - in contrast
to Bangladeshi elites and, indeed, to most other
South African elites. But they are (so far, at least)
hamstrung by unfavourable international condi-
tions and, not least, by the hesitations of nearly all
other elites in their society
Our field research was undertaken in and around four
South African cities (Durban, Pretoria, Johannesburg and
Cape Town) FebruaryApril, 1998. It was funded,
through the Institute of Development Studies Poverty
Programmes, by a grant from Britain's Department for
International Development. We are especially grateful to
Mike Morris and his colleagues at the Centre for Social
and Development Studies, University of Natal-Durban
for vital assistance. Thanks are also due to numerous
scholars at the Universities of Pretoria, the
Witwatersrand, and Cape Town, and to over 100
members of selected elites who gave patiently of their
time for extensive, semi-structured interviews.
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In South Africa, as in Bangladesh, there is no imme-
diate sense among elites that social and political
unrest poses threats. Politics, for the present, has
demobilised the poor - or rather it has mobilised
them for electoral purposes while containing pres-
sure for social transformation. But transformation
has been promised .- indeed, oversold - by the
ANC. That party therefore finds itself playing
incompatible roles, simultaneously promising
transformation and containing pressure for trans-
formation while it seeks to tackle poverty through
the pursuit of economic growth. Most members of
the ANC elite are aware of the dissonance between
these roles and of painfully slow progress in the
drive for growth.
So, in South Africa, unlike Bangladesh, the current
dispensation is seen by the ruling elite (but not
most other elites) as very likely a temporary phe-
nomenon. Unless growth takes off within a very few
years (which is improbable), vigorous efforts at
redistribution will become a political necessity. If
(when) that day comes, the ANC elite will face a
painful encounter with the complacent, hesitant
perceptions of most other South African elites.
There is insufficient space here to explore the full
array of elite perceptions in South Africa. So we
concentrate on two crucial themes: (j) the distinc-
tive character of social segmentation there and the
problems that it raises, especially for the new ruling
elite, and (ii) the response (so far) of the ANC elite.
South Africa is one of the most inequitable societies
on earth,2 although the elites that we encountered
mostly failed to recognise that fact.3 They live in a
'first world' milieu, alongside large numbers of
extremely poor urban dwellers, and surrounded by
rural areas where poverty is still more severe and
widespread. Elites are aware of urban poverty,
mainly because they are intensely preoccupied with
2 See for example the Deininger and Squire data set,
available on the World Bank web site.
Like our colleagues doing similar studies in other
countries, we interviewed members of 11 different
elites: (1) politicians in power; (2) politicians in
opposition; (3) people working in the media; (4)
influential academics and professionals; (5) union
leaders (in both blue and white collar unions); (6)
business executives, large-scale entrepreneurs; (7)
leaders of voluntary associations (including those which
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the problem of crime, which they associate with the
urban poor. But the greater problem of rural
poverty remains largely invisible to them.
We began by studying whether South African elites
had what Abram de Swaan has called a 'social con-
sciousness' - a set of perceptions which developed
in Western Europe and North America, and which
helped to open the way to the creation of welfare
states there. A 'social consciousness' exists when
elites develop:
an awareness of the interdependence of all
social groups
a realisation that elites bear some responsibility
for the sufferings of the poor
a belief that efficacious means of assisting the
poor exist or might be created
[De Swaan, 1988]
We found that most members of South Africa elites
have a less-than-fully-developed 'social conscious-
ness'. In brief, they tend to lack a strong awareness
of the first two propositions listed above, especially
the second. Their faith in efficacious means tends to
be rather vague, and to fix on economic growth. A
growth strategy tends to absolve elites of responsi-
bility for poverty. They blame it on apartheid, for
which few accept any responsibility The pursuit of
growth also makes elites appear to be part of the
solution (as generators of growth), rather than as
part of the problem. But as the months roll by,
growth appears increasingly unlikely to make much
impact.
The ruling elite of the African National Congress
(ANC) is, however, distinctly different. It possesses a
clear social consciousness on each of the three counts
listed above. This represents a curious reversal of the
exist to serve the needs of the poor); (8) civil servants in
the upper ranks; (9) high ranking military and police
officers; (10) large landowners; (11) religious leaders.
Within most of these elites, whites predominate
heavily, but the influence of non-whites is already on
the rise wïthin nearly all of them. In anticipation of the
further growth of their influence, we interviewed a
somewhat larger number of non-whites, especially
Africans, than current white dominance would
otherwise have justified.
This and numerous other problems place the ANC
elite in a very difficult position when anti-poverty
programmes and redistribution are discussed. We
shall turn to that presently, but let us first explore
another issue which has been comparatively unim-
portant in the WestlNorth, but which looms large
in all of the less developed countries that we and
our colleagues are studying - the problem of social
segmentation. An assessment of that is interesting
in its own right, and it will carry us helpfully into
a consideration of the ANC elite's excruciating
dilemmas.
1 Social Segmentation and Elite
Perceptions of Poverty
The various societies that our team are studying
(South Africa, Brazil, Bangladesh, and two contrast-
ing regions of India - Karnataka and Bihar) are sim-
ilar in being segmented; that is, they are divided by
lines running vertically from elites through the
mass, into 'primordial' or 'ethnic' groups.4 But the
character and implications of segmentation differ -
slightly or greatly from case to case. We have
encountered several, important contrasts between
South Africa and our Asian cases. These are impor-
tant because they undermine a sense of personal
obligation among South African elites towards poor
people within their own social segments. Four are
worth noting.
It is not always clear what a given person's
social segment is.
The social segments which are most real to
South African elites tend to be larger than simi-
lar segments in South Asia.
As a result both of point (b) above and,
more crucially of the extreme inequalities
which exist in South Africa, the distance (geo-
graphical, social, educational, economic, psy-
chological) between elïtes and the poor within
The word 'ethnic' tends to be more imprecise and
problematic than its widespread use in our time
suggests. For an examination of this in Indian society,
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Two imperatives - to develop (j) broad
political alliances within South Africa's new
democratic system, and (ii) an inclusive new
national identity that transcends segments -
also tend to undermine elites' sense of obliga-
tion to poor people within their segments.
Confusion about what one's social segment is All
South Africans have available to them a diversity of
identities which compete with one another for their
attention. A person may for example be a Xhosa,
but s/he will also be aware of pan-African, national,
regional, local, clan or family class, urbanlrural,
political party, religious and other identities. Some
of these identities can be seen as 'segmental' while
others cannot. But since most cut across one
another, their larger 'segmental' loyalties to the
Xhosas, Zulus, Afrikaners or whatever tend to be
undermined.
People sometimes shift their preoccupations from
one to another of the various identities available to
them, according to circumstance and recent events.
So to ask people what social segments they belong to
tends to elicit somewhat different answers at differ-
ent times, and answers are sometimes multi-faceted.
Our study indicates that elite perceptions in these
matters are less clear than those of people of lesser
status within most segments. This tends to erode
elites' sense of obligation to poor people within
their segments. In this, South Africa offers a clear
contrast to Bangladesh where some members of
elites feel a sense of deep personal obligation
towards poor people within their social segments.
South Africa is more like the south Indian region of
Karnataka, which we are also studying, but the
problem in South Africa is severely compounded by
other factors, to which we now turn.
The size of segments Social segments within
South Africa tend to be quite large. Most are far
larger than the endogamous caste groups (jati's)
which preoccupy elites in Karnataka, or the kinship
which has considerable resonance in the new South
Africa, see Manor 1996.
situation which prevails in several other countries, segments there tends to be greater than that
where the ruling elite is less prepared than some or which we find within most South Asian seg-
many other elites to contemplate efforts to tackle ments.
poverty
networks which preoccupy Bangladeshi elites.
Those Asian collectivities are usually small enough
to make face-to-face relations between elites and
many poor people within the segment possible. The
sheer size of, say, the Xhosa, Zulu, or Afrikaner cat-
egories makes it difficult for a member of an elite
from one of those groups to feel personally oblig-
ated to the generality (or even to a sizeable propor-
tion) of the poor within his or her segment.
(iii) Distance between elites and the poor within seg-
ments Most crucially, efforts by elites to address the
problem of poverty within segments are further
impeded by various types of distance that separate
elites from poor people within social segments.
Once again, this problem is much more marked in
South Africa than in our Asian cases.
Members of elites often find themselves distanced
from the poor geographically This is true in two
senses: (a) in terms of urban/rural or urban/pen-
urban separations, and (b) in terms of inter-regional
separations.
Poverty in South Africa is particularly serious in
rural areas, while elites are overwhelmingly concen-
trated in towns and cities. So elites in social seg-
ments that contain large numbers of poor rural folk
are spatially cut off from the poor within their own
segments. This makes it easy for rural poverty to
become invisible to elites in these groups, and for
them to shed a sense of obligation to poor rural
dwellers in their segment.
Within the great conurbations, geographical dis-
tance between areas inhabited by most elites (usu-
ally leafy suburbs) and those inhabited by the poor
(squatter colonies and townships in other suburbs
or near city centres) also separates elites, spatially
and psychologically, from the poor itt their own seg-
ments. This is especially important among black
people and people of mixed race.
There is a cliche, especially among whites, that
African elites are moving en masse out of town-
ships and into formerly white suburbs. Some of
that is happening, but our interviews with such
elites indicate that far more of them remain in or
See note 5 in the preceding article by Hossain and
Moore.
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near townships, and thus remain more concerned
about poor neighbours from their own social seg-
ment than is often supposed. But the movement to
the suburbs is a still a significant reality, and it will
continue. So the problem of black elites being cut
off from poverty among others in their segments
will intensify And since the worst urban poverty is
found in squatter colonies where black elites are
absent, and since squatter colonies will continue to
grow, this problem will become more serious.
The distances between the regions of this large
country also play a role here. In the apartheid era
there was considerable spatial mobility among
elites, mainly whites. In recent years, as non-whites
have been freed from restrictions on their move-
ments, such mobility has accelerated.
South Africa lacks a single, pre-eminent city in
which elites are mainly concentrated. It is more like
India or Germany, which have several important
urban centres, than like Bangladesh or Prance,
where one city predominates. It is thus common to
find members of South African elites - of all
descriptions these days - living at great distances
from most of the people in their social segments.
Our interviews consistently indicated that these
types of spatial distance erode a sense among elites
of personalised obligation to the poor within their
segments. And accelerating social and geographical
mobility appears certain to make this problem yet
more important over time.
Other types of distance compound this. Most South
African elites live in comfort in a 'first world' milieu
in which very high levels of income, economic
development and what used to be called 'moderni-
sation' have been achieved. But a huge proportion
of the population lives in severe poverty In other
words, most members of elites stand at a consider-
able (and often a vast) economic distance from the
poor within their social segments. Most members of
elites have acquired high quality education of the
'first world' sort which puts another kind of dis-
tance between them and the poor within their seg-
ments. Our interviews again showed that such
economic and educational distancing fosters an
enormous psychological distance between elites
and poor people - in general, and within segments.
One by-product of this distancing is worth tress-
ing. Partly as a result of their experience of a 'first
world' milieu, South African elites have a greater
belief than their South Asian counterparts in the
capacity of impersonal, institutional forces - partic-
ularly the state and market forces - to manage soci-
ety's affairs. In South Africa, both of these things are
vastly more formidable than in Bangladesh and the
Indian state of Bihar. They are somewhat stronger
than in a comparatively prosperous Indian region
like Karnataka. This makes it easier for South
African elites to believe that efficacious, impersonal
means exist or might be created to address the
poverty of people in all social segments, and that
further erodes their sense of personal obligation to
poor folk within their segments.
Contrary to the prevailing belief among whites, our
encounters with African leaders showed that many
members of the emerging African elites still live
modestly by the standards of whites and cannot
imagine driving BMWs. But most of them still enjoy
substantially greater incomes and far greater access
to the abundance offered by South Africa's 'first
world' milieu than their poor brethren. Most have
internalised many 'first world' habits of mind. All of
this has usually, though not always, had a deraci-
nating impact upon them and creates considerable
psychological distance between them and even the
urban and pen-urban poor within their segments.
And since severe poverty is mainly found in rural
areas, the distance between black elites and many or
most of the poor within their segments is vast.
To make matters worse, a huge number of poor
South Africans have also experienced deracination.
In the apartheid era, many were uprooted as a con-
sequence of state policy and the peculiar mixed
economy which it helped to foster. They were
deprived of pre-existing rights, not least to land,
and families were broken apart by the need for
breadwinners to migrate to urban settlements
where anomie was rife, in search of work. The
severe social dislocation experienced by deprived
people wrought as much damage to the cohesion of
social segments as did the process of elite formation
We are grateful to David Welsh for this point.
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within those segments. These trends have not been
reversed since the collapse of apartheid. We have
here a segmented society in which most of the seg-
ments are fractured beyond repair.
This is true even within the segment that was most
cossetted by the apartheid regime: the Afrikaners.
Prom the 1920s onward, the Afrikaner elite was
famously concerned with the problems of the poor
within their own segment. They had a well devel-
oped but perverse social consciousness towards the
Afrikaner poor, and they sought to use state power
to generate a 'sponsored bourgeoisie' that included
as many Afrikaners as possible.6 However, as one
telling analysis of recent history argues, by the early
1990s - after many (but by no means all) Afrikaners
had been enriched - F.W de Klerk and the
Afrikaner elite 'peacefully negotiated away their
position of ethnic dominance' on the assumption
that this would prevent the emergence of a radical
new order. They reckoned (so far, correctly) that the
'rights culture of a liberal democracy' and 'the
global predominance of a competitive market econ-
omy' would protect their material comforts.
'However, it meant that the poorer Afrikaners were
left to fend for themselves in a vastly more hostile
and competitive environment.' They sold out the
poor Afrikaners (Adam et al., 1997: 58 and 61).
Our interviews with members of Afrikaner elites
revealed a suspicion among many that this was true.
(iv) Efforts to transcend segmentation Many of South
Africa's political parties - especially, but not only the
ANC - seek to develop broad-based social coali-
tions which cut across social segments. They do so
because the imperatives of electoral politics demand
it, and because it is in the interests of national inte-
gration and of the democratic process.
Many members of elites made it clear that they are
also mightily preoccupied with the need to create a
new, all-inclusive national identity which tran-
scends segments. After apartheid, this is seen as a
matter of urgency But the progress that is occurring
on this front undermïnes the already weak sense of
obligation which elites feel towards poor people
within their social segments. The building of broad
coalitions tends to produce an important shift in
elite perceptions. It encourages elites to become
preoccupied with the impersonal obligation of the
government and the ruling party to tackle poverty -
and to de-emphasise their more personalised, phil-
anthropic obligations within their social segments.
The four points discussed above are potent enough
to undermine elite efforts to address the needs of
the poor within their social segments. So we should
not expect anti-poverty efforts within segments to
achieve much. But at the same time, these four
things do not erase social segmentation. It retains
enough importance to impede the development
both of a full social consciousness among most
elites, and of a commitment among those elites to
initiatives that address the needs of all the poor.
This and the less-than-complete social conscious-
ness among most elites creates serious problems for
the ruling ANC elite, which is left with the task of
addressing poverty But they also face other difficul-
ties in this matter. Let us now consider these.
2 The Dilemmas of the ANC Elite
A cruel, monumental irony confronts the ANC and
South Africa's new government. They have attained
power in the wake of an historic, global loss of con-
fidence in centralised governance, and a major
increase in the power of international market forces
which demand fiscal discipline. The ANC faces
popular pressure - which its inspirational rhetoric
has partly fostered - to introduce massive change.
Its remarkable success at gaining power, swiftly and
peacefully, inspires a popular belief that further
astonishing achievements are possible. So does the
heroic quality of its leader, Nelson Mandela. And
yet it operates in an era when even leftish govern-
ments are forced to engage in the less-than-heroic
politics of modest adjustments.
Some of those governments present their pro-
grammes as 'radical' experiments, but they tend to
be exercises in ìncrementalism on the cheap. Even
moderately generous public spending, never mind
expensive efforts at national reconstruction or social
transformation, runs great risks. The liberationist
agenda, on which the ANC fought the struggle
against apartheid and the 1994 election, is akin
those agendas which newly independent nations
developed across Africa and Asia a generation or
We are grateful to Tony Leiman for this point.
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two ago. But times have changed, and this presents
the ANC with agonising choices.
None is more painful than the decision on how to
address mass poverty When people in Europe and
North America abandon elements of the 'social con-
sciousness' which helped to drive redistribution
and the creation of welfare states, and when gov-
ernments retreat from their commitments to these
goals, the consequences for the poor can be serious.
But they are as nothing compared to the conse-
quences in a country with South Africa extreme
inequalities and the crushing poverty that afflicts so
many7
Our interviews with members of the ANC elite
indicate that they are torn between a persisting,
exhilarating belief that all things are possible and a
growing, dreary suspicion that in current condi-
tions, only modest adjustments are feasible. The
apartheid regime practiced racial discrimination on
so many fronts that, at first, the new government
could make numerous dramatic changes without
spending much money But most of those have now
occurred. Those that remain, which include crucial,
fundamental changes in structural conditions,
require substantial funds. This leaves the ANC elite
facing a choice between the goals of redistribution
and growth.
Some critics - for example, John Pilger in a British
television documentary - have accused the ANC
elite of betraying the South African poor by yielding
to pressure from the international arena and to the
temptations of self-enrichment. These arguments
are not wholly false. The need to court overseas
investors clearly limits the government's capacity to
pursue some redistributive programmes (although
some international development agencies also
encourage certain types of redistribution). And one
ANC leader who famously spoke of the attractions
of getting 'filthy rich' is not an isolated case. But the
reality is far more complicated and ambiguous than
the critics claim.
Many members of the ANC elite made it clear to us
that they are acutely aware of the need to redistrib-
ute wealth in a society which is marked by extraor-
dinary inequality They want to do this, both
because it will promote social justice, and because it
is politically necessary (or will eventually become
necessary - an important distinction, as we shall
see) if the ANC is to retain mass support. Evidence
for their concern with redistribution emerges not
just from interviews, but from the provisions for
social and economic rights in the new
Constitution,8 and from the ANC government's ini-
tial development strategy
ANC policies on poverty have evolved over recent
years. During the anti-apartheid struggle, it had
proposed an assertively leftish approach. But by the
time that the ANC assumed power, the Soviet bloc
had disintegrated and most parties of the left in the
OECD nations had adopted centrist or even centre-
right economic policies. This and the harsh eco-
nomic conditions which South Africa faced9
persuaded the ANC to abandon ambitions to seize
the commanding heights, but its continuing redis-
tributionist inclinations (which still survive in many
quarters) were evident in its first important initia-
tive to tackle poverty - the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RQP).
The programme consists of four components,
aimed at: (i) meeting basic needs (through job cre-
ation, land reform, programmes for housing, sanita-
tion, water, electification, nutrition, health care,
etc.); (ii) developing human resources (through
education and training, literacy programmes, fur-
ther education, the arts, sport, youth development,
etc.); (iii) democratising state and society (in indus-
try agriculture, infrastructure efforts, reform of
workers' rights and the financial sector, etc.); and
(iv) building the economy (by addressing structural
problems, creating jobs, tackling poverty promot-
ing workers' rights and skills, encouraging the
improved use of technology, upgrading infrastruc-
ture, ending discrimination, encouraging stake-
holding, etc.).'°
Many members of the ANC elite and of South
Africa's other elites see the RDP as a 'brilliant' plan.
Some elements of it (in housing and the supply of
This complex subject cannot be adequately treated in
an article of this length. But see sections 7, 9, 26-29, 39
and 1840) of the Constitution.
See J. Matisonn in the Weekly Mail and Guardian, 6
and 13 November 1998; and Waldmeir, 1997, pp.
132-34 and 252-58.
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water, for example) are having a visible effect, and
others (such as the new system of child support)
will make a difference before long. But its impact
has been seriously undermined by several things:
a shortage of financial resources
a reluctance to impose new taxes
administrative incapacity
corruption
(y) limits on the government's power
(vi) the recent adoption of a more growth-oriented
strategy which requires tight limits on public
spending.
Even if ANC leaders had not subsequently imposed
tight constraints on public spending, resources
would have fallen well short of what is needed to
make significant inroads into South Africa's vast
'social deficit'. lt is theoretically possible to generate
more resources by raising new taxes. But efforts to
do so collide with two major impediments. First,
substantial increases might alienate certain interna-
tional agencies and cost the country vital assistance.
Second and more crucially (as nearly all of our
interviews showed), middle class South Africans
from whom most resources might be raised see
themselves as heavily over-taxed already Successive
budgets have avoided raising the income level at
which higher income tax rates kick in, so now even
the lower middle classes (including nearly all of the
African members of elites that we interviewed) feel
mightily burdened. They face an income tax bite of
around 43%, and pay substantial further taxes on
consumer goods.
Administrative incapacity compounds the prob-
lem. Much of the bureaucracy is populated by
those who served under the apartheid regime. The
main problem is not that they act as saboteurs, but
that they find it very difficult to adopt more
responsive postures than in the old days - when
they bestowed resources with considerable hauteur
even to Afrikaners - to meet newly recognised
needs in what is, for the first time, a demand-dri-
ven polity"
"A Basic Guide to the Reconstruction and
Development Programme' and 'The Reconstruction and
Development Programmes: A Policy Framework',
available at the South African Government web site
www.polity.org.za/gnuindex.html.
"We are grateful to Johan van Zyl for stressing this.
New people inserted by the ANC at the apex of the
bureaucracy have begun to address this problem.
But the size and diversity of the country has forced
the central government to devolve many redistribu-
tive tasks onto provincial governments, some of
which are of poor quality and prone to malfeasance.
The ANC elite has thus far restrained itself from the
aggressive use of state power to pursue redistribu-
tion (despite a desire to do so, revealed in our inter-
views, among many in their ranks and among
African elites more generally and even among some
white elites). For example, it has not yet moved to
compel private banks to make loans in support of
low-income housing. It has also held back from
assertive action on land redistribution.
Finally and crucially, the government has in recent
times given pre-eminence to a second strand in its
anti-poverty strategy This is the Growth
Employment and Restructuring' (GEAR) pro-
gramme which entails stringent measures to main-
tain fiscal discipline in order to spur growth. It sits
somewhat incongruously alongside the earlier RDP
programme. For a while, ANC ministers were able
to argue that GEAR had not resulted in a reduction
in social spending. But even at that early stage,
GEAR placed severe limits on any enhancement in
existing redistributive programmes - which the
minister of welfare frankly conceded were 'insuffi-
cient when the inherited social deficit was taken
into account'.'2 And by late 1998, cuts in core areas
of social spending had been announced.'3
As a result of all this, the ANC will get nowhere near
the fulfilment of the inflated promises of redistribu-
tion which it made at South Africa first all-inclu-
sive election in 1994. It is now clear that those
promises were both unwise and unnecessary, since
the party would have won a major victory without
Business Day, 2 March 1998.
The education budget will lose Rand 300 million in
1999-2000, and R. 1.2 billion in the following year.
(This is occurring even though Nelson Mandela
promise of textbooks for every child cannot now be
met. State expenditure on textbooks has fallen 80%
since 1995, and in 1998-99, the government was able
to provide only R. 200 million of the R. 643 million
required for textbooks.) The health budget received an
extra R. 700 million in 1998-99, but will lose R. 100
million and R. 700 million, respectively, in the two
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making them. But they are a reality with which
ANC leaders must live. They face constant pressure
from within their own ranks for more emphasis on
redistribution and less on growth.'4 Similar argu-
ments often emerge from major think-tanks and
even from the government's own studies.' But the
1998 budget, while nodding in the direction of
redistribution, stuck firmly to tight fiscal discipline,
with growth as the overriding goal.
ANC elites justified this tough stance to us partly
because they reckon that despite the shortfall in
redistribution, enough will have been achieved in
reversing the racist practices of the old regime and
in addressing some basic needs of poor people to
persuade them to back the ANC again at the next
election in 1999. They may be right. As long as the
apartheid regime remains the main point of com-
parison in the popular mind, even minimal achieve-
ments offer a glittering contrast. The opposition to
the ANC remains badly fragmented, and opinion
poils show no single opposition party gaining sub-
stantial support. All of this appears to give the ANC
the luxury - which is unavailable to ruling parties
in many other countries - of another five years or so
to ensure that their strategies of redistribution and
growth have a mass impact.
The ANC elite has one other, potent reason for pur-
suing growth as weil as (and for the present, more
assiduously than) redistribution. In interviews, they
stressed that without growth, efforts at redistribution
and affirmative action will be zero-sum games. They
may be right, but a great deal hinges on whether their
growth strategy will work. It has plainly not worked
yet. GDP growth in 1997 was 1.9% at best, and
expectations for 1998 have been scaled down from
3% to 0.2%. These are alarmingly low figures, and
even the finance minister's best hope for 1999 and
2000 are 2% and 3% respectively.'6
subsequent years. The welfare budget loses R. 100
million in 1998-99, and will lose R. 100 million in
1999-2000 and another R. 200 million in the following
year. (Financial Mail, 6 November 1998.)
' For example, union leaders appealled on the eve of
the 1998 budget for a more aggressive effort at
redistribution and poverty alleviation.
"See for example, Business Day, 8 and 14 May 1998.
"Financial Mail, 6 November 1998, and Weekly Mail and
Guardian, 6 November 1998.
It seems inevitable to us that unless growth takes off
unexpectedly and soon, ANC leaders will be forced
by the expectations of their mainly poor supporters
to shift their emphasis to redistribution. Some of
them acknowledged this to us. That may be neces-
sary even if growth picks up - if it is jobless growth
that does little to help the poor. A change of empha-
sis will probably not occur to any great extent until
after the election of mid-1999 which the ANC will
surely win. But if the government persists with the
present approach for more than a year or two there-
after, they risk the emergence of populist opposition
parties that propose to soak the rich.
ANC leaders are acutely aware of this. A clear sign
was provided in early November 1998 by no less
than Thabo Mbeki, the president-in-waiting. In a
speech to the upper house of parliament, he cited
worrying statistics on inequality in South Africa:
The poorest 10% of households in the country
received as little as 1% of all household income
in 1995, while the poorest 20% received only
3%. The poorest 30% of households received
only 5%.. while the poorest 50% received only
11%...
The richest 20% of households had 65% of
household income...
He then stressed the close link between race and the
position of households in this hierarchy He said
that South Africa is 'in reality, made up of two
nations, one black and poor and the other white
and well off'. And he described this as 'an explosive
mixture which has to be addressed if we are to guar-
antee stability for our country'.'7
Mbeki may only have been seeking to protect the
ANC from the (as yet) modest populist challenges
which may arise in the 1999 election campaign. It
is scarcely imaginable that his speech signals an
effort to roll back the planned cuts in social spend-
ing which were announced in the same week. But if
growth remains unimpressive in another two years,
the pressure to move forcefully towards redistribu-
tion will become ferocious. In those circumstances,
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it would be astonishing if this highly astute and
pragmatic leader failed to respond - indeed, in that
speech he was positioning himself for just such a
change in policy
If (when) that happens, several of the things that
we have learned about elite perceptions of poverty
and poor people might be useful in crafting a strat-
egy to 'sell' redistribution to elites, especially
whites.
Certain elite misperceptions need to be addressed.
Elites tend to the view that poverty is mainly an
urban problem, and that it is less serious in rural
areas where poor people have somehow always 'got
by'. There is plenty of evidence available from good
recent studies'8 to disprove this, and efforts by
Mbeki and company to do so might bear some fruit.
Those same studies might be exploited to persuade
elites that they are mistaken in their belief that
South Africa's poor are better off in absolute terms
than their counterparts in other African countries.
An attempt also needs to be made to explain that
inequality in South Africa is far more severe than in
nearly all other countries. At present, elites tend to
the view that places like Brazil and India are much
more inequitable than South Africa.
Something also needs to be done to counter the
elite tendency to exonerate themselves from any
responsibility for poverty by projecting blame onto
other groups and processes. They tend to blame
apartheid, which most of them see as 'nothing to do
with me' - and now that apartheid has been swept
away, poverty is expected to decline in the normal
course of events. The widespread elite view that the
battle against poverty is the responsibility of gov-
ernment (which again is usually 'nothing to do with
me') leads many to blame politicians and bureau-
crats. Elites often see trade unions as important cul-
prits, because they have forced wages in the
organised sector to such heights that the poor suffer
grievously (There is some truth in this, but it is cer-
tainly not the central problem.) Many also blame
the poor by arguing that they are lazy, unacquainted
with the work ethic, and incapable of entrepreneur-
ial effort. Elites tend believe that the 'first world'
"Cape Times, 11 November 1998. report', 13 May 1998, available at
" See for example, Wilson and Ramphele, 1989; and
www.polityorg.za/govdocs/reports/presreview/index.html
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milieu which they inhabit offers the poor hope,
when the reality is far more ambiguous than that.
If these notions can be dented, South Africa elites
may move closer to a belief in the interdependence
of all groups in their society If populist forces out-
side the ANC begin to gain ground, elites may be
persuaded that the threat to their lifestyles and pub-
lic order is sufficient to warrant serious efforts at
redistribution. (Mbekih recent reference to redistri-
bution as a guarantee of stability was cleverly
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